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ownership, will probably continue to receive capital gains treatment. It is apparent, however, that the bases upon which such
treatment is extended or denied under section 402(a) (2) are most
arbitrary. Congress might well re-examine this source of inequitable treatment of taxpayers.87 In the meantime, the harsh consequences of taxing at ordinary rates lump-sum payments not
meeting the Mary Miller test can be avoided, even though the
plan has been terminated, by continuing the trust or by purchasing retirement annuities."
Constitutional Law: New York Criminal Procedure
Permitting Jury To Determine Voluntariness of a
Confession Held Unconstitutional
Petitioner was charged with first degree murder in a New York
State court. Under New York procedure the question of the
voluntariness of his confession was submitted to the jury. His
conviction was affirmed on appeal' and certiorari was denied.2
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of New York's method for determining the voluntari87. The policies behind the capital gains provision of § 402(a)(2) provide
no justification for the discriminations in tax treatment that have been made
between various recipients of lump-sum distributions. "There is no doubt that
the policy argument in favor of capital gains treatment of 'bunched' income
is as applicable to liquidating payments of termination of a plan as it is to
lump-sum payments on separation from service." Instant case at 954.
It has been noted that capital gains treatment is more favorable than
is necessary to solve the "bunched" income problem. See Eckerman, supra
note 9, at 11. An alternative solution to the "bunched" income problem is
now available in the ordinary income averaging provisions of INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 1801-05 (§ 282 of the Revenue Act of 1964). But Congress evidently
did not feel that this was an adequate substitute for capital gains treatment
under § 402(a) (2)-incident to passing the new averaging provision, in Revenue Act of 1964, § 282b, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 821, Congress
repealed Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 72(e)(8), ch. 1, 68A Stat. 22, which provided special treatment of lump-sum proceeds of annuity contracts, but did
not repeal § 402(a)(2) providing special treatment of lump sums from qualified
plans. Perhaps Congressional intent is to specially favor recipients of lump
sums from qualified plans in order that they might be able to provide for
themselves the retirement benefits they would have enjoyed under the plan.
If so, this policy also applies which equal force to all lump-sum distributions
from qualified plans.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-1(a)(2) (1960).
1. People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 780, 177 N.E.2d 59, 219 N.YS.d 621,
remittituramended, 10 N.Y.2d 816, 178 N.E.2d 284, 221 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1961).
2. Jackson v. New York, 868 U.S. 949 (1961).
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ness of a confession.8 The district court denied the petition, and
the Second Circuit affirmed.' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari" and held the New York procedure unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, expressly overruling Stein v. New York", which had found the procedure constitutional. 7 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
There are three basic procedures for determining the voluntariness, and therefore the admissibility, of a confession.' Under
the first procedure, the orthodox or Wigmore rule, the judge
decides the question. Only if the confession is received does the
jury consider the same evidence in determining the credibility of
the confession.' The second procedure, the Massachusetts rule,
also provides that the judge determine admissibility. However,
3. Application of Jackson, 206 F. Supp. 759 (SD.N.Y. 1962). Petitioner
also claimed that his confession was in fact involuntary. Id. at 760. The Supreme Court refused, for the time being, to consider this second claim because
it felt that the question of the voluntariness of petitioner's confession should
first be constitutionally determined in the State's courts. 878 U.S. at 893.
4. Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1962).
5. Jackson v. Denno, 371 U.S. 967 (1963). In his dissent in the instant
case, Mr. Justice Clark challenged the Court's judisdiction over the question
of the constitutionality of the New York procedure, because petitioner had
failed to raise the issue in the State courts in the prior criminal action. In
assuming jurisdiction the majority relied on Pay v. Nois, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
378 U.S. at 370 n.1.
6. 346 U.S. 156 (1953). This overruling was anticipated in Cranor v.
Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935 (1956).
7. The Court disposed of the instant case by conditionally granting the
writ of habeas corpus and returning the case to the district court, allowing
the State a reasonable time to provide the petitioner, at a minimum, with a
constitutional determination of voluntariness. If the confession is determined
to be involuntary the petitioner must receive a new trial without admission
of the confession. A determination of voluntariness allows the conviction to
stand, and a failure -by the State to give the defendant a hearing will require the
federal habeas corpus court to release the defendant. 378 U.S. at 891-95.
Presumably the petitioner will be able to directly appeal and then collaterally
attack a new determination of voluntariness. Id. at 892-93.
This disposition will, at least initially, relieve the State of the burden of
retrying Jackson, and of retrying other petitioners as the case is given retroactive effect. See United States ex rel. Gomino v. Maroney, 231 F. Supp. 154,
156 (W.D. Pa. 1964), stating that as a case brought up on habeas corpus,
Jackson must be given retroactive effect.
8. Professor Meltzer points out a fourth procedure under which the trial
judge chooses between the orthodox and the Massachusetts procedures.
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between
Judge and Jury, 21 U. Ci. L. REv. 317, 320 (1954). Jackson points out the
possibility of another procedure: using a second jury to determine the coercion question. 378 U.S. at 391 n.19.
9. Id. at 378-79; 3 WIGMORE, EvmENCE § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
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if admitted, the jury must redetermine the confession's voluntariness before determining its credibility.o Under the New York
rule, the third procedure, the judge considers the issue of voluntariness at a preliminary hearing, but resolves it only if the
evidence is undisputed; in all other cases the jury makes the
determination."
The basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson to limit
the states' power to assign trial functions between judge and jury
is that the New York procedure poses "substantial threats" 2 to
the defendant's constitutional rights to have a coerced confession
ignored" and to have a fair, reliable and reviewable determination
of the issue of voluntariness. The decision does not make clear
whether meeting a minimum standard of adequate protection is
all that is required or whether states must use the procedure or
procedures which the Court deems most protective of a defendant's rights. The major threat inherent in the New York rule is
that in considering the coercion question, the jury will be exposed
to most involuntary confessions," and so a strong probability
arises that later instructions will not prevent the jury's knowledge
of a coerced confession from affecting its final verdict.' 5 Disregarding the extralegal possibility that the jury will fail to con10. 378 U.S. at 378 n.8; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276,
5 N.E. 494 (1885).
11. 878 U.S. at 374-75; see, e.g., People v. Leyra, 802 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d

553 (1951); People v. Weiner, 248 N.Y. 118, 161 N.E. 441 (1928). It is not
clear if the judge can make a fnal determination that the confession is voluntary. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 321-22 & n.23.
12. 378 U.S. at 889.
13. A defendant may not be convicted on the basis of an involuntary
confession. Id. at 876; Rogers v. Richmond, 865 U.S. 534 (1961). This is true
even if there is corroborative evidence to sustain a conviction. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952);
Malinshi v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). For a list of the major periodical
articles dealing with confessions see Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal
Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35 n.1
(1962).
14. In practice mere conflicting accounts of the events surrounding the
confession will result in the issue of coercion being submitted to the jury.
See Annot., 85 AL.R. 870, 872 (1933).
15. See 378 U.S. at 388-89; 2 MORGAN, BASIC PRoBLEMs OF EVIDENCE
289-90 (1961); MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLOAMERICAN Sys=nt or LITIGATION 108-05 (1956); Meltzer, supra note 8, at
326-27, 351; Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARv. L. REv. 165, 169 (1929); Paulsen,
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411,
424-25 (1954). See generally Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of
Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARv. L. REV. 392
(1927).
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sider the question,"6 even when the confession is formally rejected
by the jury as coerced, the confession may increase the weight
given to corroborating evidence in the determination of the final
verdict.17 Alternatively the threat exists that the jury's knowledge
of other corroborating evidence of guilt will distort its determination of the voluntariness issue by undermining the defendant's
credibility's and reducing the significance of any extrinsic evidence
indicating involuntariness, thus creating pressure on the jury to
resolve the underlying factual disputes and the coercion question
against the accused 9 Furthermore, since the general jury verdict
provides no record of the resolution of the coercion issue,20 the
defendant cannot attack an improper determination of that
issue.2 ' He can only attack the trial judge's giving of the question
to the jury. In order to cure these defects Jackson would seem to
require a complete separation of the determination of the question
of voluntariness from the trial of the main issues of the case.
The Court also discusses a problem related to the apparent
requirement of separation - the trial judge refusing to hold the
preliminary hearing outside the presence of the jury. 2 In the
federal courts it is reversible error for a judge to so refuse?"
Although this problem was not before the Jackson Court, the
same rule should be applied in the future to state court proceedings24 because of the strong likelihood that a jury will not be able
to disregard an involuntary confession it hears at the voluntariness hearing 5
16. See 378 U.S. at 379-80; Meltzer, supra note 8, at 326.
17. 378 US. at 388.
18. Id. at 381.
19. Id. at 381-84, 386; MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE
ANGLo-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 104 (1956); Meltzer, supra note 8,
at 342. Mr. Justice Harlan, in dissent, raised the possibility of having the
jury bring in a special interlocutory verdict on voluntariness -before hearing
other evidence. 378 U.S. at 427 n.1. But see id. at 391 n.19. This would be
impractical since a new jury would have to be chosen whenever a confession
was determined to be involuntary.
20. 378 U.S. at 879-80.
21. Id. at 380. In Stein the Court had concluded that the jury's determination of the coercion issue had to be a valid one. 346 U.S. at 193-94.
22. 378 US. at 390 n.18.
23. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951).
24. State v. Owen, 96 Ariz. 274, 894 P.2d 206 (1964) (reading Jackson as
requiring hearing outside the presence of the jury); Umronr RULE OF EvIDENCE 8; cf. United States ex rel. Gomino v. Maroney, 231 F. Supp. 154, 156
(W.D. Pa. 1964). See generally Annot., 148 AL.R. 546 (1944).
25. Similarly, this case may indicate a future overruling of Delli Paoli v.
United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), which allowed the admission of the confession
of one conspirator implicating the other conspirators, at the joint trial of all
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The Supreme Court also discusses other defects that are not
limited to the New York procedure. The first problem is that
there are no findings of fact' As a result the defendant is left
without a basis for appealing a determination of voluntariness on
grounds of improper application of legal standards to the findings.
The Court did not consider the problem of inadequate or nonexistent findings under the Massachusetts and Wigmore rules - it assumed that adequate findings are always made 27 This assumption
is probably unwarranted. It is unlikely that all trial transcripts
provide findings specific enough to be used to discover or appeal
an improper application of the law to the findings? 8 Although the
lack of adequate findings may not be sufficient in itself to make
the Massachusetts and Wigmore rules unconstitutional, failure
to provide adequate findings is likely to result in cases being sent
back for a new trial or for a new voluntariness hearing because
of the inadequacy of the record on review. In the absence of
another decision setting forth a minimum requirement of specificity, a self-imposed standard of expressness at the trial level is
highly desirable.
A second imperfection noted by the Court is that if the defendant takes the stand at the preliminary hearing to testify as to the
involuntariness of his confession, he is then open to crossexamination and impeachment for all other purposes at the main
trial? The result is that many defendants are forced to choose
not to testify for fear of prejudicing the adjudication of the
ultimate issues of the caseo This deprives the fact finder of
relevant testimony on the issue of coercion. Since the defendant
is usually the only person whose testimony is likely to establish
the involuntariness or nonexistence of a confession, his failure
to testify makes the reliability of a resolution of the issue suspect, thus impairing his right to be free of a conviction based
of them, with instructions to disregard the statement except when adjudicating
the guilt of the confessor. Cf. Scott, Federal Control Over Use of Coerced
Confessions in State Criminal Cases-Some Unsettled Problems, 29 InD. LJ.
151, 154-55 (1954). See generally Annot., 54 AL.R.2d 830 (1957). However,
it should be pointed out that the defendant's right to have the confession
disregarded in Delli Paoli is probably not of constitutional dimension.
26. 378 U.S. at 379-80.
27. Id. at 378-79 & n.8.
28. Id. at 437-38 (dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan).
29. Id. at 389 n.16.
30. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 330-36. The problem should be con.
sidered in the light of Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which held the
fifth amendment applicable in state proceedings. Compare United States ez
rel. Gomino v. Maroney, 231 F. Supp. 154, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
31. 378 U.S. at 389 n.16.
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on an involuntary or nonexistent confession. The Court intimates
that continued failure to protect the defendant who testifies at
the preliminary hearing cannot be justified. The defendant who
testifies only at the voluntariness hearing should be subject to
cross-examination and impeachment, at the hearing exclusively.
Similarly, the defendant whose confession is ruled voluntary by
the judge under the Massachusetts procedure should have the
right to testify only on the issue of voluntariness before the
jury. Perhaps a defendant whose confession was determined to
be voluntary under the Wigmore rule should also be able to
testify before the jury as to circumstances surrounding the giving
of his confession that reflect on its credibility without further
waiving his fifth amendment rights.
Although the Supreme Court voiced its approval of the Massachusetts rule,3 2 the conclusion is questionable. Constitutionality
is based on the assumption that the judge does as thorough
a job as if his decision were final, and as if he were untempted by
the clean-up role of the jury 3 There is, however, a good possibility that when the judge is not solely responsible for the
decision it will not be made with the care required when his is
the only determination made.34 Furthermore, the irrevocability
of a determination of voluntariness can cause a judge to pass the
final decision to the jury by calling the confession voluntary.3 5
When the judge does not fully discharge his duty the jury will
often consider involuntary confessions and, for all practical purposes, the Massachusetts procedure will function in the same
way as the New York procedure." In view of this substantial
32. Id. at 378 n.8.
33. See ibid. For a questioning of the judge's ability to function properly
in the Massachusetts procedure see Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in
the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARv. L. REv. 165,
176 (1929).
34. See Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REV. 481,
488-89 (1946).
35. See State v. Andrew, 61 N.C. 205, 207-08 (1867); MORGAN, Son
PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AmERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION
103 (1956); Maguire & Epstein, supra note 15, at 421; Meltzer, supra note 8,
at 329-30; Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 BLARv. L. REv. 165, 176-77 (1929); of. The
Queen v. Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288 (1884); Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REV. 616, 619 (1949).
36. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-ANIaCAN
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 103 (1956); Meltzer, supra note 8, at 329-30. There
are, however, significant differences between the Massachusetts and New

York rules. See id., at 324. Primary is the fact that when the New York

procedure functions properly the jury still learns of involuntary confessions.
This cannot happen if the Massachusetts rule works correctly.
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threat to the defendant's constitutional rights, the Court may
have to reconsider its present approval of the Massachusetts
rule. The constitutionality of the Massachusetts rule may depend on whether Jackson requires that the states choose the best
procedure available for protecting defendants' rights or whether
the case only requires that state procedures meet a minimum
standard of protectiveness. Under the first theory the Massachusetts rule is probably unconstitutional because it apparently
poses a greater threat to a defendant's constitutional rights than
the Wigmore rule. Under the second theory, which is the more
likely one, the constitutionality of the procedure rests on the
substantiality of the threat that the judge does not do his job
properly.
The Jackson decision is in no sense an attack on the jury
system. The policy behind an exclusionary rule of evidence is
best implemented by the orthodox method of having the judge
determine the factual disputes related to admissibility and apply
the exclusionary rule before the jury learns of the evidence. 7
In failing to do this the New York rule was an unorthodox procedure, 8 and Jackson is a return to orthodoxy. The problem the
Court deals with in this case is not jury inability to execute
instructions, but its well-known inability to disregard improper
evidence that it has received, an inability which has been acknowledged and compensated for in various other contexts. 9
87. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 897. See also 9 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra
note 9, § 2550; see generally Maguire & Epstein, isupra note 15. But see 878
U.S. at 401 (Mr. Justice Black's dissent).
88. See Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 481,
488-89 (1946).
89. See, e.g., Esser v. Brophey, 212 Minn. 194, 8 N.W.2d 8 (1942) (evidence
of previous compromise not admissible); Blais v. Flanders Hardware Co., 93
N.H. 870, 42 A.2d 882 (1945) (proof of subsequent repairs in a negligence
action not admissible); People v. Formato, 286 App. Div. 357, 148 N.Y.S.2d
205, aff'd, 809 N.Y. 979, 132 N.E.ad 894 (1956) (proof of previous convictions
not admissible to establish guilt); Rodzborski v. American Sugar Ref. Co.,
210 N.Y. 262, 104 N.E. 616 (1914) (existence of insurance in a negligence action not admissible). See generally Trautman, Logical or Legal RelevancyA Conflict in Theory, 5 V~im. L. REv. 885 (1952).

